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This paper examines the second-best tax policy to minimize envy in the sense of
Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990). An allocation is -equitable
if no agent prefers a proportion  of any other agent's bundle. We study the allocations
that maximize  among the second-best Pareto ecient allocations. In the standard
two-class economy with identical preferences, the Chaudhuri-Diamantaras-Thomson
allocation coincides with the leximin allocation. In many-agent economies, it is possible
to order the class of second-best Pareto ecient allocations graded by progressivity in
the sense of Hemming and Keen (1983), with respect to the intensity of envy. Envy is
then minimized in the most progressive tax system.
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1 Introduction
It has been a common belief among public nance researchers that there is no alternative
to the utilitarian social welfare function and its generalized form including a welfaristic
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1version of the R awlsian maximin principle.1 O n the other hand, the social choice litera-
ture examined non-welfaristic equity criteria for resource allocation,2 but the analysis was
mainly devoted to the rst-best environment without distortionary taxation. In this paper,
we choose minimization of envy as the social objective, and analyze the policy implications
in the second-best environment.
We dene envy with respect to agents' bundle holdings. Agent i envies agent j if the
former perceives the latter's bundle to be better than his own. Alternative motivations of
the importance of envy are provided by several researchers. F irst, it suits the tradition of
the new welfare economics, which avoids both comparability and measurability of individual
welfare. S econd, V arian (1974) and Thomson and V arian (1985) emphasized symmetry in
the sense that each agent puts himself in the place of the other agent to evaluate the other
agent's position on the same terms that he judges his own. Third, as V arian (1974) claried,
we do not regard envy as the propensity to view with hostility towards the fortune of others
(R alws (1971, p.531)),3 but rather as a representation of R awls' notion of resentment:4 the
existence of envy is clear-cut evidence that agents are being treated asymmetrically, and
1The studies on the informational basis for social-welfare judgment (e.g., d'Aspremont and Gevers
(1977)) con rmed the modern public economists'presumption that interpersonal comparison is necessary for
normative public decision making. For example, `[g]iven Arrow's theorem, [the impossibility of interpersonal
welfare comparison] did not leave very much for welfare economics to do. Modern approaches, including
optimal income tax theory, are  rmly based on explicit interpersonal comparisons' (Tuomala (1990), p.24),
and `as the welfare economics literature has made clear, interpersonal comparisons are mandatory for policy
prescriptions' (Boadway (2002), p.50).
2See, e.g., Thomson and V arian (1985) and Moulin and Thomson (1997) for an overview.
3Such an individual sentiment stems from interdependent preferences, but we do not assume such pref-
erences in the present paper.
4`If we resent our having less than others, it must be because we think that their being better o is the
result of unjust institutions' (Rawls (1971, p.533)).
2reduction of such resentment is a valid social objective. F orth, a society with minimal or
fewer envy re ects a policy-maker's desire for social harmony, if there are psychological and
sociological reasons that the sentiments of envy exist. B  os and Tillmann (1985) said, `[t]he
economic rationale for a minimization or reduction of envy by taxation is the following.
Excessive envy in a society is an element of social disorder. R educing envy in a society is
a step towards increasing social harmony' (p.34).
We consider a second-best framework originated by M irrlees (1971), where an allocation
has to satisfy self-selection (or incentive compatibility). We show in S ection 3 that there
arises a hierarchy of envy, and the low-skilled agents always envies the high-skilled agent.
In order to pursue equitable and ecient tax policies based on envy, we use the notion by
Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990). An allocation is -equitable if
no agent prefers a proportion  of the bundle of any other agent. The value of  measures
the intensity of envy reduction: if  is unity, it is the usual no-envy; any feasible alloca-
tion satises zero-equitability. Diamantaras and Thomson (1990) proposed to maximize 
among the Pareto ecient allocations (hereafter referred to as the DT allocations).5 They
showed the existence of such an allocation in a rst-best environment. This paper, on
the other hand, examines the tax policy implications of their criterion in a second-best
environment.
The issue we consider is the amount of compensation given to the low-skilled agents in
5Chaudhuri's objective di ers from Diamantaras-Thomson when there are more than three types of
agents, which we will discuss in section 5.1.
3the second-best DT allocations. A con ict between reducing envy and enhancing the low-
skilled agents' welfare under second-best taxation is pursued in Nishimura (2003a) where
the available policy for the government is linear income tax (S heshinski (1972), Hellwig
(1986), and S andmo (1993)).6 When the income elasticity of leisure is less than unity, the
DT allocation may di er from the R awlsian solution. M oreover, when preferences di er,
there exists an economy in which the DT allocation is the Pareto ecient allocation which
m inim izes the welfare of the low-skilled agent. In this paper, we examine the same issue
in the context of the nonlinear income taxation model (M irrlees (1971), S tiglitz (1982)).7
It turns out that the results are substantially di erent under nonlinear taxation model.
In S ection 4 we start from a two-class economy, commonly dealt with in the optimal
taxation literature, in which there are agents with high and low skill levels. We show that
a con ict between reducing envy and enhancing the low-skilled agent's welfare discussed
above disappears when a nonlinear income tax is available. Under identical preferences,
envy reduction is consistent with enhancement of the low skill's welfare. The same con-
clusion also holds under di erent preferences among the allocations where the high-skilled
agent pays the higher tax (Proposition 1).
In S ections 5 and 6 we extend our analysis to many-agent economies. Two kinds of
6Nishimura (2003a) also examined commodity taxes an economy with many commodities. The analysis
in this paper can be extended to the multi-commodity setting. We discuss this in Section 7.
7L inear income tax has advantages of administrative simplicity and analytical tractability, and this policy
tool has been studied for a long time in the optimal taxation literature. On the other hand, nonlinear income
tax is the best policy tool to achieve any informationally feasible allocations under Mirrleesian informational
framework (see Guesnerie (1995), Chapter 1).
4tax changes, discussed in L ambert (1993, Chapter 9), are examined. F irst, the class of
the second-best Pareto ecient allocations which satisfy the following single crossing of
the tax schedules is examined: for any pair of allocations, the consumption-gross income
schedules cross once, hence the distribution of the post-tax income or welfare is more
equalized under one tax system than the other (Hemming and Keen (1983), G ans and
S mart (1996)). An example is the set of Pareto ecient allocations among those supported
by linear income taxes. We show that these allocations can be ordered with respect to the
intensity of envy: the DT criterion chooses the most progressive taxation which maximizes
the welfare of the lowest-skilled agent (Proposition 2). This result remains valid under
di erent preferences (Propositions 4 and 5). O n the other hand, when we consider `double-
crossing' tax reform, where tax cuts benet only the middle-income agents, it may well
be the case that envy is reduced under the tax system where both the highest skilled and
the lowest skilled are worse-o (Proposition 3). These results show consistency as well
as the di erence between the DT criterion and the R awlsian maximin principle, in highly
policy-relevant circumstances such as single- versus double-crossing tax reforms and the
amount of subsidies given to the hard-working poor.
2 T h e M odel
Consider an n-agent economy (n  2) with one consumption good, c, and labor, l. L et
N  f1;:::;ng. Each agent i (i 2 N) has a preference represented by a binary relation Ri,
5`at least as good as', dened over (c;l) 2 I R+[0; l]. The indi erence relation and the strict
preference relation associated with Ri are denoted by Ii and Pi, respectively. Each Ri is
a continuous ordering which is increasing in the consumption good, decreasing in labor,
and strictly convex. Each agent i is endowed with an exogenous skill level wi  0. The
set of feasible allocations is f(ci;li)n
i= 1 2 (I R+  [0; l])nj
Pn
i= 1 ci 
Pn
i= 1 wilig. A feasible
allocation is often denoted by x = (xi)n
i= 1.
We assume that both consumption and leisure are normal goods. F ormally, let (^ ci(w;T);
^ li(w;T)) be the welfare-maximizing bundle of agent i subject to the budget constraint
c = wl   T. That is, ^ ci(w;T) = w^ li(w;T)   T and (^ ci(w;T);^ li(w;T)) Ri (c;l) for all
(c;l) s:t: c = wl   T. Consumption and leisure are normal goods if, for all i 2 N, w  0,
Ta and Tb such that Ta < Tb, ^ ci(w;Ta)  ^ ci(w;Tb) and ^ li(w;Ta)  ^ li(w;Tb) hold with at
least one strict inequality.
The property of incom e elasticity of leisure is cricical in the following analysis:
D enition 1 The incom e elasticity of leisure is greater than (resp. less than/ equal to)
unity if, all i 2 N, w  0, Ta and Tb w here Ta < Tb,
if ^ ci(w;Tb) > 0; ^ li(w;Ta) > 0 and ^ li(w;Tb) <  l;then
^ ci(w;Ta)
 l   ^ li(w;Ta)
< (resp : > = =)
^ ci(w;Tb)
 l   ^ li(w;Tb)
:
Here, the income elasticity of leisure is dened in terms of `full income', w l T.8 Three
8When ^ ci(w;T) and ^ li(w;T) are di erentiable,
^ ci(w;T
a)
 l   ^ li(w;T a)
< (resp: > = =)
^ ci(w;T
b)
 l   ^ li(w;T b)
implies
w l   T
 l   ^ li(w;T a)
@ li
@ T
> (resp: < = =) 1.
6benchmark cases are studied in the optimal taxation literature. F irst, Weymark (1986) and
B oadway et al. (2000, 2002) assume that preferences are quasi-linear in leisure, in which
the income elasticity of leisure is greater than unity. S econd, the comprementary case
where preferences are quasi-linear in consumption, in which the income elasticity of leisure
is less than than unity, is studied by Phelps (1973) and Diamond (1998). Third, the case
where the income elasticity of leisure is unity is called hom otheticity. This is common in
the quantitative optimal taxation studies (M irrlees (1971), S tern (1976), Tuomala (1990),
Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999)).
It is often convenient to convert the preference Ri into ~ Ri over (c;y) 2 I R+ [0;wi l] in
the following way:
(c;y) ~ Ri (^ c; ^ y) ( ) (c;y=wi) Ri (^ c; ^ y=wi) when wi > 0; (c;0) ~ Ri (^ c;0) ( ) (c;0) Ri (^ c;0): (1)
The indi erence relation and the strict preference relation associated with ~ Ri are denoted
by ~ Ii and ~ Pi, respectively.
S eade (1982) showed that normality of consumption implies the following agent m ono-
tonicity (hereafter A M ): at any point in the consumption-gross income space, the indi er-
ence curve of the low-skilled agent is steeper than that of the high-skilled agent:
D enition 2 (C ondition A M ) F or all agents i and j w ith wi > wj and all (^ c; ^ y);(~ c; ~ y) 2
I R+  [0;wj l], (^ c; ^ y) ~ Ii (~ c; ~ y) im plies (i) (^ c; ^ y) ~ Pj (~ c; ~ y) if (^ c; ^ y) < (~ c; ~ y),9 and (ii) (~ c; ~ y) ~ Pj
(^ c; ^ y) if (^ c; ^ y) > (~ c; ~ y).
9V ector inequality: given (^ c; ^ y);(~ c; ~ y) 2 I R
2
+, (^ c; ^ y) > (~ c; ~ y) means ^ c > ~ c and ^ y > ~ y.
7The government can observe the gross income, yi  wili, of each agent i, but cannot
observe either wi or li. The income tax is used for redistribution:
D enition 3 A n incom e tax schedule Tx : I R+ ! I R su p p orts allocation x = (ci;li)n
i= 1
if (i) ci = wili   Tx(wili), (ii) (ci;wili) ~ Ri (y   Tx(y);y) for all i and all y 2 [0;wi l], and
(iii) li = 0 if wi = 0.
It is well-knwon that (i) and (ii) are equivalent to the following self-selection condition:10
8i; j 2 N; (ci;wili) ~ Ri (cj;wjlj) if yj  wi l; (2)
which requires that agent i cannot be better o by choosing the gross income and con-
sumption of agent j by working wjlj=wi hours.
Allocation (ci;li)n
i= 1 is  rst-best P areto e cient i there is no other feasible allocation
(~ ci;~ li)n
i= 1 such that (~ ci;~ li) Ri (ci;li) for all i 2 N with at least one agent with (~ ci;~ li) Pi
(ci;li). An allocation is second-best P areto e cient i it satises (2) and there is no other
feasible allocation (~ ci;~ li)n
i= 1, satisfying (2), such that (~ ci;~ li) Ri (ci;li) for all i 2 N with at
least one agent with (~ ci;~ li) Pi (ci;li).
3 T h e E q uity O b jective
3.1 H ierarch y of E nv y in th e S econd-b est E nv ironm ent
We consider envy with respect to agents' consumption-leisure bundles. Agent i envies
agent j at allocation x i xj Pi xi.11 Allocation x satises no-envy i xi Ri xj for all i
10Condition (iii) is the utility-maximization condition for i 2 N such that wi = 0.
11This formulation of envy does not require the observability of agents' labor supply. A reasonable
supposition is that the agents, as well as the government, know the demographic data in the economy, i.e.,
8and j. In the class of self-selective allocations, we observe a hierarchical structure of envy.
F irst, the higher skilled agent never envies the lower skilled agent, since the self-selection
implies:
8i; j 2 N; (ci;li) Ri (cj;
wj
wi
lj) Ri (cj;lj) if wi > 0 and wi  wj: (3)
O n the other hand, if wi > wj and Ri = Rj, then (ci;li) Pj (cj;lj) always holds,
except when lj = 0. Therefore, in a standard econom y in w hich all agents have identical
preferences, at any envy-free and self-selective allocation, at m ost one agent supplies labor
(B  os and Tillmann (1985)). This result shows that no-envy is not useful in examining
equitable and ecient taxation. Tillmann (2005) generalizes this result to economies where
preferences di er. In a class of economies that include those we study in S ection 6, this
result still holds.12 In order to pursue equitable and ecient tax policies based on envy,
we need to formulate a less demanding criterion.
3.2 R eduction of E nv y
To evaluate the intensity of envy, we will adopt a radial contraction measure advocated by
Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990).13
distribution of preferences and the skill level of the other agents, hence they correctly in fer the other agents'
labor supply as a best response to the given tax schedule.
12There are two remarks. First, B os and Tillmann (1985) originally showed that, if the skill distribution
is variable (the true economy is drawn from a skill distribution whose upper bound is in nity), the self-
selective and envy-free allocation is `no production'. Second, notice that no-envy and self-selection are
disjoint conditions if skills are unequal. There are envy-free allocations which violate (2), and most of the
self-selective allocations invite envy of the lower skilled as shown in (3).
13Several alternative concepts of no-envy are proposed in the social choice literature. Feldman and
Kirman (1974)  rst advocated reducing envy based on a cardinal measure; their measure is the di erence in
utilities (see B os and Tillmann (1985) for tax policy implications of their concept). H owever, their concept
9F igure 1 around here.
F igure 1 illustrates the idea. At allocation x, agent i envies agent j. B y continuity
and monotonicity, the straight line connecting the points (0; l) and xj = (cj;lj) intersects
agent i's indi erence curve passing through xi exactly once. The point of intersection is
denoted by (~ c;~ l), and thus xi Ii (~ c;~ l). The ratio x
ij 
 l   ~ l




measures the factor by
which one would have to shrink j's bundle in order for i to stop envying j. The inverse of
x
ij indicates the extent to which agent i envies agent j at allocation x.
F ormally, let  2 I R+ be a nonnegative real number, and let  be the operation such
that (ci;li)  (ci; l ( l li)), which represents a proportional contraction of agent i's
consumption-leisure bundle. G iven allocation x, let x
ij 2 I R+ be such that xi Ii (x
ij  xj)
when xj Ri xi, and x
ij  1 when xi Pi xj.14 L et x  mini;j x
ij.
D enition 4 A llocation x is -equitable if x  , or equivalently, 8i; j 2 N; xi Ri
(  xj).
is not invariant with respect to monotonic transformations of the utility functions. The property does not
suit the classic assumption of new welfare economics: social choice should be ordinally invariant. On other
alternative concepts advocated by the mid 1980's (see Thomson and V arian (1985)), Tillmann (1984) and
B os and Tillmann (1985) show that most of them are not successful in addressing the B os-Tillmann's result
discussed above. On the concepts in economies with di erent consumptive talents (Arnsperger (1994),
Section 6), we can easily see that the application of these criteria into the current environment also results
in the B os-Tillmann's result.
14H ere, we modify the de nition of Diamantaras and Thomson (1990). In the current environment, the





ij  xj) may not exist when xi Pi xj.
10Diamantaras and Thomson propose to maximize x in the set of Pareto ecient alloca-
tions (hereafter referred to as the DT allocation).15 O ur goal is to examine the tax policy
implications of their concept, by seeking an allocation which maximizes x in the set of
the second-best Pareto ecient allocations.
4 T w o-class E conom ies
We start with a two-class economy, commonly dealt with in the optimal taxation literature.
Without loss of generality, we examine a two-agent economy (n = 2) with w2 > w1. We
begin with the case of identical preferences, i.e., R1 = R2  R.
4.1 T h e S econd-B est P areto O p tim a
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the set of second-best Pareto ecient allocations.
It is convenient to proceed with the preference ~ Ri dened in (1). Hereafter, `the self-
selection constraint of agent i against agent j (i 6= j)' is abbreviated to S S i. The S S i
is binding at allocation ((c1;l1);(c2;l2)) if (ci;wili) ~ Ii (cj;wjlj). Also, let the incom e-
consum ption curve of agent i (hereafter ICC
i ) be the collection of the bundles (ci(T);yi(T))
dened with respect to T 2 I R such that ci(T) = yi(T)   T and (ci(T);yi(T)) ~ Ri (~ c; ~ y) for
all (~ c; ~ y) s:t: ~ c = ~ y   T. Namely,
ICC
i  f(c;y) 2 I R+  [0;wi l]j(c;y) = (ci(T);yi(T)) for some T 2 I Rg: (4)
15This is in general di erent from Chaudhuri's (1986) concept. H owever, they are the same in a two-class
economy with a hierarchy of envy. The di erence in a many-agent economies will be discussed in Section
5.1.
11F ollowing the convention of the optimal taxation literature, we say that the m arginal incom e
tax rate of agent i is zero at a self-selective allocation x = (cj;lj)n
j= 1 if (ci;wili) 2 ICC
i .
We now introduce the following result in the optimal income taxation:
Lem m a 1 (S tiglitz (1982)) A t any second-best P areto e cient allocation, (i) at m ost one
self-selection constraint is binding, and, (ii) if S S j (j 6= i) is not binding, the m arginal
incom e tax rate of agent i is zero.
F igure 2 illustrates this result on (c;y)-space.
F igure 2 around here.
In each panel, the upward-sloping curves denoted by ~ Ii are indi erence curves of agent
i, namely, the sets ~ I(a; ~ Ri)  fb 2 I R+[0;wi l]jb ~ Ii ag corresponding to bundle a. B y agent
monotonicity (AM ), for all a, ~ I(a; ~ R1) is steeper than ~ I(a; ~ R2). The dotted curves, denoted
by ICC
i , are the income-consumption curves of agent i (i = 1;2). B y strict convexity,
(ci(T);yi(T)) is unique for all T. B y normality, ICC
i is downward sloping.
Panel (a) depicts allocations where the marginal income tax rates of agents are zero.
F rom the second welfare theorem, every rst-best Pareto ecient allocation corresponds
to allocation G(T)  ((c1( T);y1( T)=w1);(c2(T);y2(T)=w2)) for T 2 I R. F or example,
G(0) is the laissez-faire allocation, which trivially satises (2). B y Tillmann (1989, Propo-
sition 1.1.1), there is a continuum of rst-best Pareto ecient allocations which satisfy (2),
i.e., there is a nondegenerate interval [T;T]  I R such that G(T) is self-selective for all
12T 2 [T;T]. L et A  (A1;A2)  G(T) and B  (B1;B2)  G(T). Any point along A1B1
corresponds to a bundle (c1( T);y1( T)=w1) constituting G(T), T 2 [T;T], and there is
a corresponding bundle (c2(T);y2(T)=w2) for agent 2 along A2B2.
Panel (b) illustrates allocations in which S S 2 binds. S ince G(T), T > T does not satisfy
S S 2, a transfer of income to agent 1 greater than T through income taxation is possible
only if agent 1's consumption-gross income deviates from ICC
1. S tiglitz (1982) showed
that, at any second-best Pareto ecient allocation where agent 1 receives a subsidy greater
than T, the bundle of agent 1 has to be southwest of ICC
1, and that of agent 2 belongs to
ICC
2.16 In panel (b), the bundle of agent 2 belongs to B2D2, and there is a corresponding
bundle for agent 1 on B1D1 (for example, (B0
1;B0
2) is an allocation with B0
1 ~ I2 B0
2). F rom
D  (D1;D2) in the panel where l1 = 0, no further transfer to agent 1 is possible. As
we increase the transfer to agent 1 from allocation B to D, agent 2's welfare apparently
decreases. O n the other hand, due to the increased distortions, the welfare of agent 1 may
or may not increase by increasing the transfer to him. Therefore, some allocations in panel
(b) may be second-best Pareto inecient.
Panel (c) illustrates allocations where the transfer to agent 1 is lower than T. In
such allocations, S S 1 is binding,17 and the bundle of agent 1 belongs to ICC
1. F rom
C  (C1;C2), where w2l2 = w1 l in the panel, no further transfer to agent 2 is possible. As
16In the conventional terminologies, downward distortion is imposed on agent 1 who faces the positive
marginal income tax rate, and no distortion is imposed on agent 2.
17For an illustrative purpose, we will depict the case that w2l2  w1 l at A2 so that agent 1 can supply
the gross income w2l2 at allocation A (in other words, there exists T 2 I R such that (c1( T);y1( T)) ~ I1
(c2(T);y2(T))). Otherwise, there is no second-best Pareto e cient allocation where S S 1 binds.
13in panel (b), some allocations in panel (c) may not be second-best Pareto ecient.
Panel (d) illustrates the set of second-best Pareto ecient allocations. Along B1D1,
agent 1's welfare is maximized at E1. This means that any bundle along E1D1 gives a lower
welfare to agent 1 than E1, so that the corresponding allocations are not second-best Pareto
ecient. An analogous explanation applies for F2. The allocation which maximizes the
welfare of agent 1 among the second-best Pareto ecient allocations is called the lexim in
allocation.
4.2 V ariation in x in th e N on-R egressive A rea
L et us evaluate the allocations with respect to Chaudhuri-Diamantaras-Thomson's measure
dened in S ection 3. As discussed earlier, when preferences are identical, x
21 = 1 and x
12 
1 for any self-selective allocation (with the second inequality strict except at allocation D
in F igure 2). Therefore, we can identify x = x
12.
L et the non-regressive area be the Pareto ecient subset of the area where S S 1 is not
binding, corresponding to the Pareto ecient subset of allocations in panels (a) and (b) in
F igure 2. We now show that the higher is the transfer to agent 1, the higher x is in this
area.
Lem m a 2 C onsider a tw o-class econom y w ith identical preferences. In the non-regressive
area, x is m axim ized at the lexim in allocation.
P roof: As shown in F igure 2, S S 1 is not binding in the non-regressive area. B y L emma 1,
the bundle of agent 2 belongs to ICC
2. Consider any pair of allocations x = ((c1;l1);(c2;l2))








2 and z2 P x2, normality implies c0
2  c2 and l2  l0
2 with at least
one strict inequality. Therefore, (z  z2) P (z  x2). Combining with x1 P z1 I (z  z2),
we have x > z. Q .E .D.
4.3 V ariation in x in th e R egressive A rea
F or those whose concern is the redistribution from the high-skilled agent to the low-skilled
agent, L emma 2 is sucient to conclude that envy is minimized at the leximin allocation.
However, the maximization of x does not necessarily imply redistribution from the high-
skilled agent to the low-skilled agent. In fact, the change in x at allocations in panel
(c) of F igure 2 (hereafter the regressive area) would be analyzed when preferences are
di erentiable. The following is proved in an appendix:
Lem m a 3 C onsider a tw o-class econom y w ith identical preferences. S uppose that prefer-
ences are tw ice continuously di erentiable. Then x increases as w e increase the w elfare
of the low -skilled agent am ong the second-best P areto e cient allocations.
4.4 D i erent P references
We now consider the case with n = 2 and w2 > w1 where preferences di er, i.e., R1 and
R2 di er. B rito et al. (1990, Corollary 1) show that L emma 1.(i) and (ii) still hold under
di erent preferences. Therefore, as in the case of identical preferences, we can divide the
second-best Pareto ecient allocations into the three cases: (a) no self-selection constraint
15is binding; (b) S S 2 is binding; (c) S S 1 is binding. We now examine the pattern of x
12 in
cases (a) and (b) (the non-regressive area). Applying Proposition 3 of B rito et al. (1990),
the marginal income tax rate of agent 2 is zero: that is, as is depicted in F igure 2, agent
2's bundle belongs to ICC2, which is downward-sloping on (c;y)-space if consumption
and leisure are normal goods. Therefore, L emma 2 is extended to the case of di erent
preferences: in the non-regressive area, x
12 is increasing w hen x
12 < 1 as w e increase
the w elfare of the low -skilled agent. B rito et al. (1990, Proposition 4) also show that the
marginal income tax rate of the highest tax payer is zero, so that the non-regressive area
includes every second-best Pareto ecient allocation where the high-skilled agent pays the
higher tax.
L emma 2, L emma 3 and the above discussion are summarized as a following proposition:
P rop osition 1 C onsider a tw o-class econom y.
1. A m ong the second-best P areto e cient allocations w here the high-skilled agent pays
the higher tax, x increases w hen x
12 < 1, as w e increase the w elfare of the low -skilled
agent.
2. If preferences are identical and tw ice continuously di erentiable, then x increases
as w e increase the w elfare of the low -skilled agent am ong the second-best P areto e cient
allocations.
Proposition 1 contrasts Nishimura (2003a) in which the available policy for the government
is linear incom e tax. F ormally, consider a class of allocations where there exist some  and
16 such that:18
8i 2 N; li = ^ li((1   )wi; ); ci =  + (1   )wili and
n X
i= 1
wili = n: (5)
He showed that, (i) when preferences are identical, envy reduction is consistent with en-
hancement of the welfare of the low-skilled agent when the income elasticity of leisure is
greater than or equal to unity (Nishimura (2003a, Proposition 1)); (ii) when the income
elasticity of leisure is less than unity, the DT allocation may di er from the leximin al-
location (Nishimura (2003a, Proposition 2)); (iii) when preferences di er, there exists an
economy in which the DT allocation is the Pareto ecient allocation which m inim izes the
welfare of the low-skilled agent (Nishimura (2003a, Proposition 3)). In contrast, our Propo-
sition 1.1 is valid in the case of di erent preferences as well. Also, Proposition 1.2 is valid
when the income elasticity of leisure is less than unity. Therefore, a con ict between envy
reduction and compensation to the low-skilled agent depends on whether the government's
tax possibilities are restricted or not.
5 M any -A gent E conom ies
We now consider many-agent economies with identical preferences, R. S uppose that the
agents' skill levels are ordered with wi  wi+1 for all i = 1;:::;n 1 with at least two strict
inequalities.
18Namely, the tax that supports the allocation x is T
x(y) = y , which consists of the single marginal
income tax rate, , and the uniform basic income, . This is the simplest form of redistributive income
taxation which is widely studied by Sheshinski (1972), H ellwig (1986) and Sandmo (1993) and others.
175.1 Identi cation of th e E nv y ing/E nv ied A gent
In discussing the Diamantaras-Thomson allocations, we rst need to identify the pair
of agents i and j such that x
ij = mini;j x
ij for each allocation x. B ecause of the
hierarchical structure discussed in S ection 3, it is natural to conjecture that x
1n is the
smallest among x
ij's. This is true when the income elasticity of leisure is greater than or
equal to unity.
Lem m a 4 C onsider an n-agent econom y w ith identical preferences. F or any self-selective
allocation x, x
1j  x
ij for all i and j. M oreover, if the incom e elasticity of leisure is greater
than or equal to unity, x = x
1n. W hen the incom e elasticity of leisure is less than unity,
x 6= x
1n m ay happen at som e self-selective allocation x.
Even if we omit counting the psychic compensation that the higher skilled agent obtains
from the lower skilled agent's misfortune (namely, greater than one x
ij), there arise n(n 
1)=2 pairs of envy (the lower skilled envying the higher skilled). Indeed, it is hard to
characterize the optimal allocation on the basis of Chaudhuri's (1986) additive criterion.19
O n the other hand, L emma 4 shows that it is easy to identify the target for minimization
19Chaudhuri's measure is the minimization of the sum of 1=
x














x  mini;j 
x
ij matters. On the other hand, with this equity criterion, it is the sum of
envies that matters.
18of envy with respect to the Diamantaras-Thomson (1990) criterion.20
5.2 V ariation in x W h en S ingle-C rossing A p p lies
We consider two kinds of binary comparisons, which are typically considered in tax re-
form discussion, according to L ambert (1993). F irst, we examine the case where the
consumption-gross income schedules induced by the tax schedule that supports each alloca-
tion cross exactly once, which is called single-crossing by Hemming and Keen (1983). The
case of double-crossing, where tax cuts benet only the middle-income agents, is examined
in the next subsection.
The single-crossing is dened with respect to the income tax schedules that support
allocations (recall Denition 3). F ormally:
D enition 5 F or self-selective allocations x and z, x single-crosses z if there exist Tx()
and Tz() that support x and z respectively, such that there exists y such that Tx(y) 
Tz(y) for all y  y and Tx(y)  Tz(y) for all y  y.
Notice that, under AM , at any self-selective allocation x = (ci;li)n
i= 1, wnln  wn 1ln 1 
:::  w1l1 and cn  cn 1  :::  c1 hold. Therefore, the implication of single-crossing is that
20This point relates to Rawls' (1974) argument that `informational requirement' is an advantage of the
maximin solution (compared to utilitarianism). `Once the least-favored group is identi ed, it may be
relatively easy to determine which policies are to their advantage. By comparison it is much more di cult
to know what maximizes average utility. ... In application [the maximization of the average utility] leaves
so much to judgment that some may reasonably claim that the gains of one group outweigh the losses
of another, while others may equally reasonably deny it' (Rawls (1974), p.343). One may argue that the
identi cation of the least-favored is as hard as that of cardinal comparison of the utility gains and losses
among alternative allocations. On the other hand, -equitability gives a systematic way of identifying the
least favored. The advantage vis-a-vis Chaudhuri's measure with respect to computation is similar to that
of maximin vis-a-vis utilitalianism.
19the tax schedules are ordered according to their progressivity, in the sense that, starting
from a critical agent, every higher income earner (hence higher skilled agent under AM )
is worse o , and every lower income earner is better o under one tax schedule than the
other. The following lemma can be shown, applying G ans and S mart (1996), Proposition
2.
Lem m a 5 C onsider an n-agent econom y w ith identical preferences. C onsider self-selective
allocations x and z w here x single-crosses z. If xi P zi (resp. zi P xi) for som e i 2 N,
then xj R zj (resp. zj R xj) for all j 2 N w ith wj < wi (resp. wj > wi).
In addition to single-crossing, we impose either of the following two requirements. F irst,
agent n, the highest-skilled agent (the highest income earner under AM ), bears the highest
tax burden among all the agents. This is a minimal requirement of `ability to pay'.21 A
second alternative is homotheticity of preferences, which is common in the quantitative
optimal taxation studies (M irrlees (1971), S tern (1976), Tuomala (1990)). In the class of
second-best Pareto ecient allocations which satises the above requirements, we can show
the following:
P rop osition 2 C onsider an n-agent econom y w ith identical preferences.
1. If the second-best P areto e cient allocations x and z satisfy: (a) x single-crosses z,
and (b) the highest incom e earner pays the highest tax paym ent, then x
1n  z
1n.
21U nder the welfaristic framework, this property is satis ed if the social welfare function satis es the
redistributive property (Guesnerie and Seade (1982)); that is, the redistribution from the higher skilled
agent to the lower skilled agent is desirable as long as the self-selection constraint is satis ed.
202. If preferences satisfy hom otheticity, and if the self-selective allocations x and z




P roof: 1. B y L emma 5, x1 R z1 and zn R xn. B y Proposition 4 of B rito et al. (1990),
agent n's bundle belongs to ICC
n dened in (4). The rest of the derivation is the same as
that of L emma 2.
2. B y L emma 5, x1 R z1 and zn R xn. Under homotheticity, the latter implies that
(z
1n  zn) R (z
1n  xn). We then conclude that x1 R z1 I (z
1n  zn) R (z
1n  xn), so that
x
1n  z
1n. Q .E .D.
It is well-knwon in the optimal taxation literature that the analytical features of the
second-best Pareto optimal allocations are highly complex. However, Proposition 2 pro-
vides a simple and useful way to order the class of second-best Pareto ecient allocations
with respect to the intensity of envy. L emma 4 shows that, when the income elasticity
of leisure is greater than or equal to unity, x = x
1n at any second-best Pareto ecient
allocation. Therefore, the DT allocation coincides with the leximin allocation in the range
of allocations ordered by progressivity. Notice that, although Hemming and Keen (1983)
showed that the single-crossing relation is not transitive, we can order the welfares of agent
1 and x
1n among the allocations satisfying the single-crossing: if x is more progressive than
x0 and x0 is more progressive than z, then x1 R x0





21When the income elasticity of leisure is less than unity, there are two potential reasons
that envy reduction may not justify a progressive tax system. F irst, when x 6= x
1n as
shown in L emma 4, the envied agent may be an agent with middle income, not the one with
the highest income, so that progressive taxation that possibly benets the middle income
may not reduce envy. S econd, when a more progressive taxation reduces the labor supply
(increases leisure) of the envied agent, it may have a negative e ect on envy. Intuitively,
when the income elasticity of leisure is less than unity, agents prefer leisure more relative to
consumption as they become poorer. S ee Nishimura (2003a), pp. 507-508 and pp. 519-520
in the case of the linear income tax.
Proposition 2 can also hold in economies with a continuum of agents with bounded
highest skill. We make use of the result of `zero marginal income tax rate at the highest
income' (Phelps (1973), S adka (1976) and S eade (1977)) which holds under an assumption
that the highest-skilled agent bears the highest tax burden.22
The case of linear income taxation is a special case of single-crossing.23 Nishimura
(2003a, Proposition 1) showed that envy reduction is consistent with higher progressivity
when the income elasticity of leisure is greater than or equal to unity. S ame result is
obtained in the case of non-linear income tax.
22Consider an economy with a continuum of agents with identical preferences represented by R. The
agent's skill level w belongs to an interval [w;w] according to a CDF F(w). A skill distribution is bounded
if w < 1. At any second-best Pareto e cient allocation, the marginal income tax rate at the highest




). If it is negative (by the binding second-order incentive constraint), an agent with lower skill level
bears higher tax burden, which is a contradiction. Diamond (1998) showed that this result is no longer
valid when the skill distribution is unbounded (w = 1).
23Straight lines cross at most once. If the lines do not cross, one allocation Pareto dominates another.
225.3 V ariation in x W h en S ingle-C rossing D oes N ot A p p ly
In general, however, there are second-best Pareto ecient allocations which do not single
cross, and tax reform sometimes entails tax cuts on the middle-income only, increasing the
tax burden and the welfare loss of the top and the bottom. R egarding envy, we can nd
an allocation where the Diamantaras-Thomson measure is higher at an allocation than the
leximin allocation when we allow double-crossing. We now show the following:
P rop osition 3 There exists an econom y in w hich a self-selective allocation x has a higher
x than the lexim in allocation and m oreover it is P areto noncom parable w ith the lexim in
allocation.
P roof: Consider the following three-agent economy: w1 = 1; w2 = 3; w3 = 5, preferences
R can be represented by a common utility function u(c;l) = c( l   l),  l = 1.
The leximin allocation, L = (cL
i ;lL
i )3
i= 1, is as follows:
cL
1 = 0:72847; lL
1 = 0; cL
2 = 1:05457; lL
2 = 0:30923; cL
3 = 2:07234; lL
3 = 0:58554; L = 0:92094:





1 = 0:73361; lx
1 = 0:01361; cx
2 = 1:03669; lx
2 = 0:29556; cx
3 = 2:06500; lx
3 = 0:58700; x = 0:92113:
(cL
i ;lL
i ) P (cx
i ;lx




2 ), so that x is Pareto noncomparable
with L. Q .E .D.
Here, both L and x satisfy condition (b) of Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, but, in order
for TL() and Tx() to support L and x respectively, TL(w1lL





3 ) < Tx(w3lL
3 ) have to hold. As w1lL
1 < w2lx
2 < w3lL
3 , TL() and Tx()
cannot single-cross. Envy reduces (i.e., z > L) at the expense of the welfares of both the
envying agent and the envied agent (i.e., (cL
1;lL




3 ) P (cz
3;lz
3)).
6 T w o-D im ensional C h aracteristics
The optimal taxation literature typically assumes identical preferences. However, in this
section we show that the result of Proposition 2 also holds in economies with di erent
preferences. L et R be a class of preferences satisfying the properties mentioned in S ection
2, and W  [0;1) be a class of agents' possible skill levels. L et w; w 2 W denote the lowest
and the highest skill levels, respectively. The characteristics of an agent are determined by
preference R 2 R and the skill level w 2 W . An economy with the above characteristics is
called a tw o-dim ensional econom y.
The following two assumptions are employed. F irst, there is an agent whose preference
for leisure is the lowest at any point in (c;l)-space. F ormally, there exists R 2 R such
that, for all (^ c;^ l);(~ c;~ l) 2 I R+  [0; l] and R 2 R, (^ c;^ l) I (~ c;~ l) implies: (i) (^ c;^ l) P (~ c; ~ y)
if (^ c;^ l) < (~ c;~ l), and (ii) (~ c;~ l) P (^ c;^ l) if (^ c;^ l) > (~ c;~ l). That is, I((c;l);R) is  atter than
I((c;l);R) in (c;l)-space, which means that an agent with preference R has the lower
propensity to consume leisure than one with R. S econd, there exist agents i; j 2 N such
that (Ri;wi) = (R;w) and (Rj;wj) = (R;w). These conditions are weaker than ones
employed in the optimal tax studies by S andmo (1993), Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) and
24Tillmann (2005). They consider an economy in which agents can be ordered with respect
to their preferences for leisure (stronger than the rst assumption), and the distribution of
(Ri;wi); i 2 N has full support in R  W (stronger than the second assumption).
Issues addressed by R oemer (1996, 1998), R oemer et alii. (2003), F leurbaey and
M aniquet (1998, 2006, 2007), B ossert et al. (1999), and S chokkaert et al. (2004) with
important policy relevance are the choice among the tax schemes that enhance the wel-
fare of the lowest-skilled agents, and the amount of compensation given to agent i with
(Ri;wi) = (R;w) (`the hard-working poor'), consistent with notions of fairness. B elow
we discuss these issues regarding envy-minimization under two cases: (i) w = 0 and (ii)
w > 0.
6.1 T h e C ase of w = 0
We rst examine the case where there are agents whose skill levels are zero. The following
result is proved in an appendix.
P rop osition 4 C onsider a tw o-dim ensional econom y. S uppose that the incom e elasticity
of leisure is greater than or equal to unity.
1. if the second-best P areto e cient allocations x and z satisfy: (a) x single-crosses z,
and (b) the highest incom e earner pays the highest tax paym ent, then x  z.
2. if preferences satisfy hom otheticity, and if the self-selective allocations x and z
satisfy: (a) x single-crosses z, and (b) xi Pi zi and zj Pj xj for som e i 2 N and j 2 N,
then x  z.
253. if the allocations x and z are supported by linear incom e taxes and x single-crosses
z, then x  z.
As Proposition 2, this proposition can also hold in economies with a continuum of agents
with bounded highest skill.
Proposition 4 shows that, in the class of allocations graded by progressivity, the DT
allocation coincides with an allocation that maximizes the low est incom e. Justication for
maximizing the lowest income in the case of w = 0 is given by F leurbaey and M aniquet
(1998, 2007). F leubaey and M aniquet (1998) advocated the following com pensation axiom
for a comparison of two allocations: allocation x is preferred to allocation z if, for all i 2 N,
zi Pi xi ) 9 j 2 N; Ri = Rj; xj Pi zj and xi Rj xj: (6)
This has a resembrance to Hammond's (1976) equity axiom.
If x and z are self-selective, (6) implies wi > wj. If a tax schedule that supports each
allocation crosses once, then x single-crosses z (x is more progressive). Therefore, the
compensation axiom is consistent with increasing progressivity in the sense of Hemming-
Keen (1983), which is in turn consistent with reducing envy. F lauebaey and M aniquet
(1998, Proposition 1 and 2007, Theorem 1) also showed that the maximization of the lowest
income is consistent with an extension of the leximin principle based on the notions of
responsibility and compensation. B asically, when the lowest skill level is zero, maximizing
the welfare or an opportunity set of the lowest-skilled agents is equivalent to maximizing
26the lowest income, which is also consistent with reducing envy in the sense of Diamantaras-
Thomson.
6.2 T h e C ase of w > 0
A con ict between reducing envy of agent i and that of j with wi = wj = w and Ri 6= Rj
arises when w > 0. The preferred tax rates of these agents, as well as the tax rates
that minimize the envy of these agents di er. With regard to envy minimization, the
following result can be shown. As a benchmark, we assume homothetic and di erentiable
preferences, where R is represented by a unitility function u(c;l;R). We also restrict our
attention to the linear income taxation24 where there exist some  and  that satisfy (5).
L et x()  (ci();li())n
i= 1 be such an allocation,25 and let v(;wi;Ri)  u(ci();li();Ri).
P rop osition 5 C onsider a tw o-dim ensional econom y. S uppose that, for all R 2 R, there
exist agents i; j 2 N such that (Ri;wi) = (R;w) and (Rj;wj) = (R;w). S uppose also that
preference R is hom othetic and represented by a tw ice-continuously di erentiable unitility
function u(c;l;R) for all R 2 R. A t any allocation x() w here li() > 0 for i 2 N such










24In the literature of fair income taxation mentioned above, most researches focus on linear income
taxation.
25De ne () implicitly by ()n 
Pn
i= 1 wi^ li((1 )wi; ()) = 0. Then li()  ^ li((1 )wi; ()),
ci()  () + (1   )wili().
27B y the same logic as in L emma 5, in the range where the increasing tax rates enhances the
welfare of the hard-working poor, it also enhances the welfare of any agent with the lowest
skill who has higher preferences for leisure. Proposition 5 shows that this is also consistent
with reducing envy in the sense of Diamantaras-Thomson. Therefore, in this range, envy
reduction is consistent with increasing the welfare of any agent with the lowest skill.
However, there are some cases where envy reduction entails the decrease of the welfare of
the lowest-skilled agents, i.e.,
@v(;w;R)
@
< 0, R 2 R is compatible with
@x()
@
> 0. F irst,
the proof of Proposition 5 in an appendix shows that, if the uncompensated labor-supply
curves are upward-sloping (
@^ li(w;T)
@w




along the Pareto frontier, regardless of the sign of
@v(;w;R)
@
. S econd, when the full-
support assumption is dropped, there is an economy in which the DT allocation is the
Pareto ecient allocation which m inim izes the welfare of the low-skilled agent (Nishimura
(2003a), Proposition 3).
7 C oncluding R em ark s
This paper has examined the second-best tax policy to minimize envy in the sense of
Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990). We have rst shown that the
Diamantaras-Thomson allocations coincide with the leximin allocation when consumption
and leisure are normal goods in the two-class economy (Proposition 1). We conjecture that
the result may not hold when there is an inferior good, which we leave as an open question
28to be addressed in future work. This also relates to the point discussed by Dixit and S eade
(1979) in the utilitarian case, who showed that there is a possibility of regressive tax policy
when there is an inferior good. In many-agent economies, it turned out that the property of
income elasticity of leisure is cricical. The assumption of homothetic preferences is a good
benchmark case. We showed that, under homotheticity, the DT criterion selects the most
progressive taxation in the sense of Hemming and Keen (1983) and G ans and S mart (1996)
among those which can be ordered with respect to progressivity (Propositions 2, 4 and 5).
However, the ranking with respect to single-crossing is partial, and we have shown that
envy reduction may be justied by reducing welfare of both the highest- and the lowest-
skilled agents (Proposition 3). G iven that the analytical features of the second-best tax
schedules are highly complex, our results provide simple and useful policy prescriptions for
reduction of envy, in policy-relevant circumstances such as single- versus double-crossing
tax reforms and the amount of subsidies given to the hard-working poor.
O ur results can be generalized to an economy with many commodities in the following
way. When a fully non-linear tax policy is feasible (where the self-selection condition is
the necessary and sucient condition for tax implementability), the result of Proposition
1.1 holds. When the feasible policies are restricted to a linear commodity taxation and
non-linear income taxation (Edwards et al. (1994), G uesnerie (1995)), (i) the results of
Proposition 1.1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 hold when Ri can be represented by
ui(ci;li) = ui(f(ci);li) for all i, where f : I Rk
+ ! I R+ is common for all individuals (a
29generalized form of weak separability discussed in Atkinson and S tiglitz (1976)), and (ii)
the result of Proposition 1.2 holds under identical homotheticity or ui(ci;li) = u(f(ci);li)
for all i with f : I Rk
+ ! I R+ bing homothetic. The proofs are straightforward extensions of
those of Propositions 1, 2 and 4. G eneralizations of these results would be left for future
researches.
The present paper is part of a larger project in welfare economics to address the equity-
eciency trade-o . As a complementary approach to this paper, Nishimura (2003b) char-
acterized the shape of non-linear income taxes and commodity taxes when the government
is concerned not just with social welfare but also with the reduction of envy, based on
V arian's (1976) generalized social welfare function and Tadenuma's (2002) Equity-rst
Principle. No-envy and its alternatives have been one of the most celebrated concepts in
the social choice literature. M ore broadly, the analysis of tax policy implications based
on non-welfaristic value judgments would deepen the discussion of the normative analysis
of taxation. It is also an important eld of the application of the theory of distributive
justice.
A p p endix
P roof of L em m a 3
B y L emma 2, it is sucient to show that x decreases along the regressive area (the
Pareto ecient allocations in panel (c) of F igure 2), as the transfer to agent 1 decreases
(or equivalently, the allocation is less favorable to agent 1).
30L et u(c;l) be a utility function that represents R. In the rgressive area, allocation
x = ((cl;l1);(c2;l2)) is characterized by: (i) c1 = w1l1   T1 (where T1 is the tax payment
by agent 1), (ii) c2 = w2l2 +T1 (scal budget balance), (iii) u(c1;l1) = u(c2;w2l2=w1) (S S 1
is binding), and (iv) ucw1 + ul = 0 (where ur  @u=@rj(c;l)= (c1;l1) (r = c; l)) or c1 = 0
((c1;w1l1) 2 ICC
1).26 Di erentiation of (iii) taking account of (i), (ii) and (iv) yields:
ul
w1




where ^ ur  @u=@rj(c;l)= (c2;
w2
w1




ul=w1   ^ uc




We now consider the change in x by changing one tax parameter T1, by di erentiating




ul=w1    ucx(w2dl2=dT1 + 1)    uldl2=dT1
 ucc2    ul( l   l2)
;
where  ur  @u(x  (c2;l2))=@r (r = c;l). The denominator of the right hand side is
positive. S ubstituting (8), the numerator is:
ul
w1












x (^ uc + ^ ul=w1)    uc(ul=w1   ^ uc + ^ uc + ^ ul=w1)    ul(ul=(w1w2)   ^ uc=w2)
^ uc + ^ ul=w1
(9)
26The condition of c1 = 0 refers to the case of the corner solution. For other possibilities: (a) l1 = 0
belongs to a non-regressive area (see Figure 2). (b) The possibility of l1 =  l and w2l2 > w1l1 are excluded
from the regressive area (see footnote 17). Notice that w2l2 > w1l1 (e.g., Stiglitz (1982), p.230).
27The left hand side of the above equation is uc(w1dl1  dT1)+uldl1. When c1 > 0, we apply (iv). When
c1 = 0, w1l1 = T1, so that dl1 = dT1=w1.
31Notice that w2l2 > w1l1 (e.g., S tiglitz (1982), p.230). B y (iii) and (iv), the denominator of





















































B y construction,  ^ ul=^ uc+ ul= uc > 0, so that, combining with w1 < w2,  uc^ uc( ^ ul=(^ ucw1)+
 ul=( ucw2)) > 0, i.e., the last term of (10) is positive. Consider now the rst and the
second terms.
ul^ ul=w 1
x (^ uc=^ ul + 1=w1) is positive. If  uc= ul + 1=w2 < 0, the remaining term
is also positive. O therwise,  ^ uc=^ ul <   uc= ul  1=w2 < 1=w1,28 so that ^ uc=^ ul + 1=w1 >
 uc= ul + 1=w2. Also, ^ ul   ul under normality, and x < 1. Combining these facts, (10) is
positive.
B y (9) and (10), we conclude that dx=dT1 < 0. Q .E .D.
P roof of L em m a 4
B efore proving L emma 4, we rst introduce the following notations. L et I(a;R)  fb 2
I R+[0; l]jbIag be an indi erence curve in (c;l)-space, and U(a;R)  fb 2 I R+[0; l]jbRag
be the upper counter set, and L(a;R)  fb 2 I R+  [0; l]jaRbg be the lower counter set.
L et ^ I((c;l);;R)  f(^ c;^ l) 2 I R+  [0; l]j9 (~ c;~ l) 2 I((c;l);R) s:t: ^ c = ~ c; ( l   ^ l) =  l   ~ lg
be a homothetic expansion of I((c;l);R) with proportion
1

, and ^ L((c;l);;R)  f(^ c;^ l) 2
I R+[0; l]j9 (~ c;~ l) 2 I((c;l);R) s:t: ^ c  ~ c; ( l ^ l)   l ~ lg. The following lemma is helpful.
28L et u
2




c > w2 in the regressive area (see Figure 2). By




c, so that  ^ ul=^ uc > w2. By construction,  ^ ul=^ uc >   ul= uc.
32Lem m a 6 F or any allocation x = (ci;li)n
i= 1 and agents j and k w ith Rj = Rk  R,
if xk R xj, and the incom e elasticity of leisure is greater than or equal to unity, then
f(c;l)jc  ck; l  lkg \ L(xk;R)  f(c;l)jc  ck; l  lkg \ ^ L(xj;x
jk;R).
P roof: L et take any (c;l) 2 I(xk;R) and let ^ w be the lowest value of w such that
U((c;l);R)  f(c;l)jc   wl  c   wlg, i.e., the lowest wage level generating the com-
pensated demand (c;l). L et (^ c;^ l) be the intersection of I(xj;R) and the set f(c;l) 2
I R+  [0; l]j(c;l) = (cj( ^ w;T);lj( ^ w;T)) for some T 2 I Rg. L et (~ c;~ l) be the intersection of
I(xj;R) and the straight line connecting the point (0; l) and (c;l). B y continuity, mono-
tonicity and normality of demand, the points (^ c;^ l) and (~ c;~ l) are uniquely determined. Also,
since income elasticity of leisure is greater than or equal to unity, ^ c  ~ c and ^ l  ~ l. L et ~ w be
the lowest value of w such that U((~ c;~ l);R)  f(c;l)jc   wl  ~ c   w~ lg. B y strict convexity,
we obtain ~ w  ^ w for all (c;l) 2 I(xk;R), which derives the desired result. Q .E .D.
P roof of L em m a 4: L et x = (ci;li)n
i= 1 be any self-selective allocation. It is straightfor-
ward to show that x
1j  x
ij 8 i; j 2 N.
Consider rst the case where the income elasticity of leisure is greater than or equal to
unity. B y AM , ci  cn for all i. If li  ln, apparently x
1i  x
1n. It is left to show that
x
1i  x
1n when ln  li. B y L emma 6, f(c;l)jc  cn; l  lng \ L((cn;ln);R)  f(c;l)jc 
cn; l  lng \ ^ L((c1;l1);x
1n;R). Combining with the observation that f(cj;lj)jwj  wig 
L((ci;li);R) for all i at any self-selective allocation ((3)), it follows that for any (ci;li),
i = 2;:::;n   1, with li  ln, (ci;li) 2 ^ L((c1;l1);x
1n;R), which implies that x
1i  x
1n.
33Consider next a three-agent economy where R is represented by the following utility
function:
u(c;l) = minfc   s1l;c   s2l + (s2   s1)^ l1;c   s3l + (s3   s2)^ l2 + (s2   s1)^ l1g   (l)2;
where we set ^ l1 = 0:5; ^ l2 = 0:9; s1 = 0:1; s2 = 2; s3 = 4; w1 = 0:2; w2 = 2; w3 = 2:1,
 = 0:000001 and  l = 1. In this utility function, preferences are quasi-linear with respect
to consumption, and thus the income elasticity of leisure is 0. Consider the competitive
equilibrium allocation x = (x1;x2;x3) = ((0:1;0:5);(1;0:5);(1:89:0:9)). This allocation
is second-best Pareto ecient. In this economy, x = x
12 = 0:55000 < x
13 = 0:56769.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose x(ci;li)n
i=1 single-crosses z and xi P zi. Let Tx() and Tz() be income tax
schedules that support x and z, respectively, such that there exists y such that Tx(y) 
Tz(y) for all y  y and Tx(y)  Tz(y) for all y  y. Let hx(y)  y   Tx(y) and
hz(y)  y   Tz(y). By the weak axiom of revealed preference, hx(wili) > hz(wili). Single-
crossing implies that hx(y)  hz(y) for all y  wili. By AM, wili  wjlj for all j 2 N such
that wj < wi. Since Tx() supports x, then (cj;wjlj) ~ Rj (hx(y);y) for all y  wj l, and
thus (cj;wjlj) ~ Rj (hz(y);y) for all y  minfwj l;wilig. If wili > wj l, we reach the desired
conclusion of xj R zj. Suppose that wili < wj l. Let ~ L(a; ~ Ri)  fb 2 I R+  [0;wi l]ja ~ Ri bg.
We then have f(hz(y);y)jwj l  y  wilig  ~ L((ci;wili); ~ Ri) by xi P zi, and f(c;y)jc 
34ci; wj l  y  wilig\ ~ L((ci;wili); ~ Ri)  f(c;y)jc  ci; wj l  y  wilig\ ~ L((ci;wili); ~ Rj) by
AM. Since (cj;wjlj) ~ Rj (ci;wili) by self-selection, we conclude that (cj;wjlj) ~ Rj (hz(y);y)
for all y  wj l, and xj R zj, the desired conclusion. The same logic applies if zi P xi and
wj > wi. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop osition 4
Let x = (xk)n
k=1 be any self-selective allocation, and let i; j 2 N be such that (Ri;wi) =
(R;w) and (Rj;wj) = (R;w). We will show that x = x
ij. To see this,  rst, for any
k 2 N, if wk = w = 0, then xk = (c;0) for some c. Second, AM, (3) and the de nition of R
imply xj R xk and cj  ck for all k 2 N. By an analogy to Lemma 6, xk 2 ^ L(xj;x
ij;R)
for all k 2 N. Third, as U(xk;Rk)  U((c;0);Rk)  U((c;0);R) for all k 2 N, if
xm ~ Rk xk for some m 2 N, then the straight line connecting xm and (0; l) crosses I(xk;Rk)
at U(xi;R). As a result, x
ij  x
km for all k;m 2 N. We then have x = x
ij. The rest of
the proof is the same as that of Proposition 1.3 in N ishimura (2003a) and Proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop osition 5
Let x = (xk)n
k=1 be any self-selective allocation. Let take any R 2 R , and Let i; j 2 N be
such that Ri = Rj = R, wi = w and wj = w. We  rst show that minm;k2N ; Rk=R x
km =
x
ij for all R 2 R . When preferences are homothetic, ^ I(xi;x
ij;Ri) = I(xj;Ri) for all
i; j 2 N such that Ri = Rj and wi  wj, i.e., homothetic expansion coincides with
the agent's indi erence curve. F rom (3), xj Rj xk for all j; k 2 N with wj  wk. It
35follows that, if Ri = Rj; wi = w and wj = w, then xk 2 ^ L(xj;x
ij;Ri) for all k 2 N, so
that x
ij  x
ik for all k 2 N. As in Lemma 4, ik  mk for all i;k;m 2 N such that
Ri = Rm and wi  wm. Therefore, minm;k2N ; Rk=R x
km = x
ij for all R 2 R . As a result,
x = minfx
ijji; j 2 N; Ri = Rj; wi = w and wj = wg.
D e ne () implicitly by ()n  
Pn










, where k > 0 is agent k's marginal utility
of income (that is, the Lagrange multiplier of maxc;l u(c;l;R) s:t: c = (1   )wkl + ).
By assumption for the preference for leisure, ^ li((1   )w; ) > ^ lj((1   )w; ) for all






> 0 for all R 2 R .
N ext, any utility function that represents a homothetic preference is such that u(c;l;R) =
^ u(c; l  l;R) = g(R(c; l  l)), g : I R ! I R is an increasing function, and R : I R+ [0; l] !
I R+ is homogeneous of degree 1. Then,
u(c;l;Ri) = u(  (^ c;^ l);Ri) ( ) Ri(c; l   l) = Ri(^ c; l   ^ l):
F or the purpose of the proof, we only need to examine the case where u(c;l;R) = R(c; l l).
Let take any R 2 R , and let i; j 2 N be such that (Ri;wi) = (R;w) and (Rj;wj) =
(R;w). We now di erentiate v(;w;R) = u(x






i( wili + @=@)   x
ijj ( wjlj + @=@)
 u
j
ccj    u
j




ij  (cj;lj);R)=@r (r = c;l). The denominator of the right hand side
of (11) is positive. We now check the numerator. By homogeneity of degree 1, k =
v(;wk;R)
(1   )wk l + 
(k = i; j). N oting also that v(;wi;R) = u(x
ij (xj);R) = x
ijv(;wj;R),






























(wjlj   wili)
!
;
where Zk  (1 )wk l+ (k = i j). N otice that Zi < Zj,  wili +@=@  0 (with strict
inequality if Ri 6= R), and wjlj  wili by AM (with strict inequality if lj > 0). H ence, the
value of (11) is positive at all i; j 2 N such that (Ri;wi) = (R;w) and (Rj;wj) = (R;w).




An alternative expression of the numerator of the right hand side of (11) is:
v(;wi;R)
 














@=@ > 0 along the Pareto frontier. If lj  li (i.e., under
@^ li(w;T)
@w
 0), then the
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